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MANAGEMENT: HISTORIC PATHS, CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS AND THE
UNCERTAIN FUTURE
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ABSTRACT: More than a decade ago Schmidt (1989) called for consideration of animal welfare to become a "firstorder" decision rule in wildlife management concerns, including animal damage control. Although there has been
movement in that direction, this clearly has not yet come to pass. This paper takes a brief look at the interests we call
animal damage management, animal welfare and protection, animal rights, and environmentalism in order to speculate
about their shared concerns and the uncertain future before them. Since animal damage and the management of that
damage cannot be abstracted from the environmental context in which they occur, this leads to speculation that some
confluence of the interests of animal damage management, animal protection, and environmentalism will lead to a new
disciplinary focus in the future.
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though, since they chose the vehicle of excommunication
in the late fourteenth century to punish the parish
sparrows for defecating on the pews (Ryder 1989). This
was followed a half century later in a protestant ban on
yet another flock of this species who were condemned for
"vexatious" chattering and "scandalous unchastity" during
the delivery of the sermon (Evans 1906). Whatever
effect these procedures had, unfortunately, bas been lost
to history.
While we might find such actions amusing and typical
of the "quaint" thinking and practices of our ancestors,
they were administered in apparent seriousness. The
human-animal relationship in medieval times was
obviously quite different than now, among other reasons
perhaps because many people literally lived under the
same roof with their animals. It was an entirely different
mind set that led medievalists to hold animals responsible
for their actions in a way that often mirrored the
responsibilities discharged on their fellow humans. Evans
(1906) exhaustively documented the phenomenon of
formally charging and bringing animals to trial for
various crimes, and the volume of cases he documents
suggest this activity was seriously pursued. Still debated
is whether this activity arose because of a feeling of
closer kinship to the animals, or simply reflected a fear of
the unknown and of losing control over natural forces that
could potentially be overwhelming. By the seventeenth
century the work of pioneering naturalists such as Francis
Willoughby and John Ray had opened the door to the
perception of nature in its own right, rather than in terms
of analogies and resemblances to man (Thomas 1983).
This was one of the most profound scientific revolutions
in human history, but it took the poet in Samuel Taylor
Coleridge to aptly characterize it when he said: "Nature
has her proper interest; and he will know what it is, who
believes and feels, that everything has a life of its own."

INTRODUCTION
This paper takes a brief look at the interests we call
animal damage management, animal welfare, and
protection, animal rights, and environmentalism in order
to speculate about their shared concerns and the uncertain
future before them. More than a decade ago Schmidt
(1989) called for consideration of animal welfare to
become a "first-order" decision rule in wildlife
management concerns, including animal damage control.
Although there has been movement in that direction, this
clearly has not yet come to pass. Animal welfare has
been accepted and centralized in areas where research,
experimentation, education, and food production are
concerned, raising the question as to why it has not been
centralized in animal damage management (Fisher and
Marks 1996). Answering that question is well beyond the
scope of this paper, but a brief look at the historic threads
behind these endeavors can be a start down that road.
HISTORIC THREADS
Wildlife Damage Management
Both wildlife damage management and animal welfare
interests share the attribute of having only recently
displayed above-ground growth despite having roots that
extend deep into the historic past. Wildlife damage
management is typically regarded as an American
invention, dating from C. Hart Merriam's tum of the
century efforts to establish an Office of Economic
Ornithology as a pillar of goal-oriented research into
human-wildlife conflicts.
But humans were clearly
dealing with animal damage long before Congress first
decided to issue an appropriation for it. Conflicts with
wildlife certainly had to have started as soon as humans
had settled on a sedentary mode of life, although just as
certainly we should expect no early record of what must
have been just a part of daily life. As early as the first
century AD, however, the Roman historian Josephus was
describing metal spires put by the citizens of Jerusalem on
roofs to keep birds from landing there, suggesting the use
of a technology prominently in use today. The clerics
of St. Vincents may not have been up on their Josephus,

Animal Welfare and Protection
Human concern over the right and wrong treatment of
animals also undoubtedly occurs much earlier than
records attest, and perhaps has always been part of human
432

consciousness. Pythagoras (530 BC) argued against
animal sacrifices and advocated vegetarianism a half
millennium before the Jerusalem of Josephus was sacked.
His school reasoned against these acts because of a belief
in reincarnation, but Plutarch (ca 50 AD) advocated
vegetarianism on moral grounds as a general duty of
kindness, and so is noted as one of the very first
advocates of animal welfare. Others followed. Leonardo
da Vinci would buy wild songbirds in the market so that
he could set them free (Ryder 1989), and foresaw a day
when it would be a criminal offense to conduct
experiments on animals (Dolan 1999). Francis of Assisi,
the patron saint of animals, is said to have cut a deal with
the wolf of Agobio, who had adopted the antisocial habit
of eating local villagers. The saint negotiated a lifetime
feeding contract for the predator, perhaps the ultimate
deal for any species of wildlife, if his predatory
indiscretions were to stop. The wolf agreed, they shook
on the deal, and apparently, no more villagers were eaten
(Ryder 1989).
The real battle line for forces with opposing views on
animals crystalized during the early 15th century through
the writings of Rene Descartes and adherents of the
Cartesian school, which he founded . The Cartesianists
felt that animals were no more than complicated
machines, whose use-or abuse-was irrelevant to any
consideration of morality.
Without the faculty of
sentience, animals could not be accorded the privilege of
feelings. This concept was vigorously counter-argued by
any number of opponents, with sentiments culminating in
Jeremy Bentham's oft-cited observation that: "The issue
is not, can they reason? Nor, can they talk? But, can
they suffer!" (cited in Ryder 1989: 75). The advent of
the Darwinian era was to answer that question
conclusively. Sometimes lost in Bentham's argument, and
others that would follow, was the fact that he was
concerned with suffering and the infliction of pain, more
than about death itself. Death was for Bentham an
irrevocable fact of nature.
The modern animal welfare movement in America
dates from the efforts of the New Yorker Henry Bergh to
halt animal mistreatment, particularly that of the draft
animals he saw being abused daily throughout the city.
Bergh started the first animal protection organization in
the United States, the American Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), in 1866.
Given the authority to pursue cases of animal cruelty in
New York's courts, it is of some interest to note that one
of the first cases he brought was against a sea captain and
his crew who were engaging in the practice, common
during those times, of catching sea turtles, turning them
on their back and punching holes in their fins to secure
them with rope on the deck of the ship. The remarkable
endurance of these animals meant thflt they would stay
alive and fresh for much of the long period of voyages at
sea. The judge considered the case for only a moment
before throwing it out of court on the grounds that turtles
were not animals and could not be covered by the new
animal cruelty law (Zawistowski 1998).
The idea of animal protection took a dramatic tum in
the mid-1970s, with the emergence of the field of animal
rights. Generally dated from the publication of Peter
Singer's work, Animal Liberation (1975), animal rights
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interests focus on the underlying moral questions and
issues that surround human use-any use-of animals. As
Singer notes, if it is morally wrong to treat humans-even
noncognizant infants or impaired adults-in such a way as
to cause pain, suffering or death, then it was wrong to do
the same with animals. The idea of animal rights drew
heavily from the civil rights and feminist movements of
the 1960s and was measurably different from earlier
animal welfare movements, with the notable exception of
anti-vivisectionism.
There are sometimes considerable differences of
opinion and emphasis between animal rights and welfare
perspectives (Schmidt 1989; Rutberg 1997).
The
principal distinction seems to lie in the fact that advocates
of animal rights are generally opposed to any sort of
human use or control of wild animals. Animals are
viewed as possessing "rights" equivalent to those which
humans might enjoy, and human domination or control of
animals as individuals or populations is regarded as
speciesism, a term coined by Richard Ryder to represent
the moral equivalent of racism or sexism. Animal
welfare advocates do not unilaterally oppose all use of
animals, especially when the overall benefits of engaging
in exploitive activities outweigh the harm animals endure
(Regan 1998). A central point for welfarists is that
animal suffering should be eliminated, preventable deaths
eliminated and animals always treated humanely; points
Hooper (1994) confirms in a recent survey as mainstream
among animal protection and welfare groups.
Environmentalism
Environmentalism has it own roots in early
visionaries such as John Muir and Henry David Thoreau,
and is undoubtedly, as Roderick Nash points out,
traceable to " ... powerful liberal traditions as old as the
republic." (1989:200). For practical purposes, however,
this interest, like animal damage management and animal
welfare and protection, can be viewed as a relatively
recent phenomenon, largely due to the vast impact of the
publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring. There are
many nuances to environmental thinking and
environmentalists often argue principles among
themselves, widely differ with and criticize traditional
ecologists and stand somewhat aghast at the constructs
advocated by animal welfare and animal rights adherents.
J. Baird Callicott (1980), a leading environmental
spokesman, criticized the animal liberationists for their
"atomistic" (i.e., interest for the rights of individual
organisms) as opposed to "holistic" (i.e. interest in the
community) concerns. As Nash (1989) describes it, the
reaction from animal rights was to characterize the
environmentalist's emphasis on holism as placing the good
of the community over the good of the individual, to the
rights advocates a philosophically untenable stance. Such
disagreements overlooked the fundamental commitment
of environmentalists to the concept of ecological
egalitarianism, whereby an environmental ethic is seen as
a restraining device on human excesses.
This is
essentially what much of the animal welfare and
protection community strives to achieve as well- a
restraint on human excesses.
It is through embracing the concept of biocentrism
(Nash 1989) that both proponents of the environment and

advocates of those parts of the environment that exhibit
unusually high levels of sentience and sensitivity-the
animals-should find their common ground. Biocentrism,
as an appositional concept to anthropocentrism, seeks to
consider the extension of the rights, privileges, and
protection that are a given as our moral responsibility to
fellow humans onto other living things and potentially to
the nonliving as well. Biocentric thinking incorporates the
idea of recognizing the rights of every form of life to
function normally in an ecosystem (Nash 1989), and
understandably evokes a sometimes extreme response in
traditional wildlife managers and wildlife damage
specialists through use of that ever-provocative term,
"rights" (e.g., Bidinotto 1992). But the concept of biotic
right is a cornerstone of the land ethic advocated by Aldo
Leopold (1949), and was apparently long a part of his
thinking in formulating this thesis. Indeed, a Leopold
essay written in 1923, but unpublished until 1979, entitled
"Some fundamentals of conservation in the Southwest,"
went so far into the biocentric camp as to suggest that the
earth was ". . . an organism possessing a certain kind and
degree of life." By 1949, Leopold had settled on the
concept of land rather than earth to express his ideas, but
his basic point remained intact: the biotic integrity of the
land should be preserved.
That the concept of "rights" extends to nonhumans is
becoming more mainstream, not just in the ivory towers
of academia where the issue can be debated with a
minimum of intellectual bloodshed, but in the real world
where economic consequences obtain as well. The
landmark case brought by the Sierra Club on behalf of a
small Hawaiian bird called the palila took on the Hawaii
Department of Land and Natural Resources in seeking
protection against the habitat loss that could condemn the
species to extinction. This case represented the first time
in American legal history that a non-human stood as a
plaintiff before the bar (Nash 1989) and it was to the
benefit of all that the nonhuman won its day in coun.
Now, with such provocative concepts as biophilliadefined as human reverence for life and biological
diversity (Kellert 1996)-increasingly being recognized as
important organizing concepts for societal action, we may
already be past the issue of rights and on to new
challenges.

(Craven 1996) and the scientific principles and premises
that establish the field's approach (Dolbeer 1998).
To many outsiders and some practitioners as well, the
field appears to need to go back to asking what its basic
premises are (Bromford and O ' Brien 1995; Hone 1994,
1996). This is especially evident in the fundamental
questions asked by Hone (1996) about the relationship of
"pests" to "damage." For example, in collating empirical
data from 39 studies, Hone discovered that only slightly
more than half showed a linear relationship between pest
abundance and damage, a finding that begs questions
concerning traditional types of assumptions and decisions
regarding the choice and extent of control measures.
Animal damage management has to become more attuned
to and involved with ecological approaches as well. The
history of ecology is generally mute with regard to animal
damage management (e.g., Mcintosh 1991), except in
passing mention on the issue of introduced species. More
encouraging are recent calls for greater scientific rigor
(e.g. , Dolbeer 1998), more careful attention to what can
be called "minimum effective control strategies" (Marion
1988) or stepwise decision-making approaches (Slate et
al. 1992) that open the door to greater understanding and,
perhaps, acceptance of the goals of damage management
programs.

CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS
The role of science in animal damage management as
a constructive force seems without question to be
emerging through hard-nosed self-criticism that points to
the need for more attention to, and rigor in, the
application of the scientific method to this field. A quick
look at keynote speeches to the Vertebrate Pest
Conference suggests the discipline was preeminently
concerned in the 1970s with the public's opinion
regarding the methods and techniques used in animal
damage management and the justification for their need,
particularly as regards the use of toxicants (e.g ., Swanson
1976; Momboisse 1978; Dietz 1984). The 1980s and 19'JOs
show an emphasis on concern for the sort of activism
arising in both the environmental and animal protection
camps (e.g., Mccann 1980; Bidinotto 1992; Berryman
1994). Lately, the focus seems to have shifted toward
consideration of the growth and diversity of the field
434

DISCUSSION
Animal damage and the management of that damage
cannot be abstracted from the environmental context in
which they occur. Animal damage management is a
highly applied discipline in which practitioners engage in
specific goal-oriented activities that address not only
biological and ecological issues, but social and political
ones as well. The challenge for practitioners seems to be
to accept this larger context and work to improve services
and capabilities, while acknowledging that the available
biological and ecological information does not always
point the way with unequivocal certainty to a correct
"solution."
The core elements of the sort of inter- and multidisciplinary approach needed to deal exactly with those
concerns have been outlined by Robert Dorney (1989) in
his discussion of a proposed new field that he termed
environmental management. Although he died before
bringing his vision for this profession to fruition,
environmental management was conceived to be a
consulting practice that would combine elements of the
"social, natural, engineering, design, and geographic
services .. . " working under a shared conceptual
framework based on ".. . a systems approach, a human
ecology view, an environmental ethic, and a willingness
to work for private, government, or community groups in
a political and legal context. " (1989:5). More than a
dozen specializations, ranging from hydrologist to social
scientist might be necessary to function capably in
environmental management, and there has to be the
political support and will to see that decisions emanating
from it are enforced-potentially a tall order. The field
of environmental management was to be founded on an
"ethical triad" of reverence for life, for land and for
biological diversity. To this outsider, this seems like a
pretty good prescription for some of the headaches animal
damage management has recently been afflicted with.
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